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Abstract 
This paper assesses the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes that 
brought into being the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue. New Zealand’s role in the 
decolonisation of its former colonies has generally been seen as quite benign. New Zealand’s 
status as an external actor however raises questions regarding the effect its influence had on 
the democratic legitimacy of the respective constitution-making processes.   
Constituent power theory demands that a constitution is the product of the popular political 
will; an act of self-determination undertaken by the people, for the people. This paper argues 
that the existence of external influence in the constitution-making process is not necessarily 
at odds with this. The democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process is dependent 
on the constitution being a manifestation of the people’s constituent power. Insofar as 
external actors do not displace the people’s constituent power but rather enhances it, there is 
no reason to exclude such influence; there may even be reason to encourage it.  
By drawing on New Zealand’s experience in decolonisation, this paper ultimately advances a 
two-stage model for constitution-making in the context of small, dependent non-self-
governing island-states. As on-going political ties with an external state are often sought, the 
aim of the model is to provide an avenue for that external state to participate in or contribute 
to the constitution-making process while maintaining the process’ democratic legitimacy. 
Word length 
The text of this paper is approximately 14,663 words (excluding footnotes not including 
substantive material, abstract, table of contents, and bibliography). 
Key words 
Constitution-making, Decolonisation, Constituent Power, The Cook Islands, Niue. 
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I Introduction 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, a wave of constitution-making washed across the Pacific region 
as several of the world’s remaining colonised territories welcomed in a new era of 
independence in some form. Two such countries were the Cook Islands and Niue which, in 
1965 and 1974 respectively, became self-governing states in free association with New 
Zealand. In both cases, this significant political shift was accompanied by the coming into 
force of national constitutions. 
This paper will explore the processes that brought into being the Constitutions of the Cook 
Islands and Niue. At decolonisation, both states rejected full independence and explicitly 
sought on-going political ties with New Zealand as a condition to their advancement towards 
self-government. As a result, New Zealand recognised a role for itself in the constitution-
making processes and exerted significant influence throughout. Though New Zealand’s role 
in this regard has generally been seen as quite benign, its status as an external actor raises 
questions regarding the effect its influence had on the democratic legitimacy of the resulting 
constitutional regimes.   
Classical constitutional theory locates constituent power - that is, the power to frame a 
constitution - in the people or the nation. By making those who will be bound by the 
constitution the source of its authority, the democratic legitimacy of the constitution is 
ensured. A democratically legitimate constitution is one that the people ‘give to themselves’. 
For some states, the implicit exclusion of external actors in this classical notion of constituent 
power is unproblematic – constitution-making will proceed as an exclusively national 
exercise with nominal regard for external actors or states.  For small dependent states such as 
the Cook Islands and Niue however, external actors simply cannot be ignored in the 
constitution-making process. For these states, the importance of their ties with an external 
state require recognition; their fragile political, economic and social realities demand a more 
flexible and responsive conception of constituent power.  
This paper aims to assess the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes 
behind the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue, taking account of New Zealand’s role. 
While this paper accepts that the processes may have lacked democratic legitimacy, it will 
challenge the assumption behind classical constituent power theory that this is the inevitable 
result of New Zealand’s influence. A strict conceptualisation of constituent power 
fundamentally limits analysis of constitution-making and fails to recognise the potential for 
external influence to enhance popular constituent power.  
With a view to establishing a more nuanced (and helpful) approach to assessing the effect of 
external influence, this paper will explore the possibility of reconciling the theory of 
constituent power with the reality of external influence in constitution-making. Ultimately it 
5 
 
will argue that reconciliation is possible – but that external influence must be carefully 
managed to maintain the democratic legitimacy of the process. An analytical framework 
aimed at identifying democratically legitimate external intervention in the constitution-
making process will be advanced, and it is on this basis that the constitutional experiences of 
the Cook Islands and Niue will be assessed. 
Though critiquing New Zealand’s role in the decolonisation process of its former colonies is 
a key component of this paper, it is by no means the primary aim. In 2010, the United 
Nation’s General Assembly declared 2011-2020 the Third International Decade for the 
Eradication of Colonialism.1 Despite the best efforts of the United Nations and the 
Committee of 24 (Special Committee on Decolonization), there remain 15 non-self-
governing island-states.2 Though these island-states do not appear to be getting closer to 
completing the decolonisation process,3 in the instance that they do, it is likely that this will 
be on the condition that political ties with the colonial power will continue into the future.4 
For constitution-making, this presents a challenge. By seeking ongoing ties with an external 
state – careful attention must be paid to ensure that the constitution is the product of a 
popular exercise of constituent power.  Towards addressing this challenge, this paper will 
explore how constitution-making in the context of small, dependent non-self-governing 
island-states can include a role for an external power, while maintaining the process’ 
democratic legitimacy.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Following an account of the procedurally normative 
conception of democratic legitimacy on which this paper is based, a background to the 
processes behind the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue is given. In the first 
instance, the processes undertaken are analysed with recourse to classical and contemporary 
conceptions of constituent power in constitutional theory. In light of the difficulties presented 
by these conceptions, the paper goes on to advance a more flexible conception of constituent 
power which is considered more appropriate to assess the effect of external influence on the 
democratic legitimacy of a constitution-making process. The constitutional experiences in the 
                                                
1 Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism GA Res 65/119, A/Res/ 65/119 (2011). The 
first international decade was proclaimed by International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism GA Res 
43/47, A/Res/43/47 (1988). The second international decade was proclaimed by Second International Decade 
for the Eradication of Colonialism GA Res 55/146, A/Res/55/146 (2000). 
2 The remaining non-self-governing island-states are: American Samoa, Guam, Pitcairn, Tokelau, Anguilla, 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, US Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Montserrat, 
and Turks and Caicos, St Helena, French Polynesia and New Caledonia. Gibraltar and Western Sahara are also 
non-self-governing territories, but are excluded from the scope of this paper – the focus of which is island-states. 
See: United Nations “United Nations List of Non-Self-Governing Territories” 
http://www.un.org/en/events/nonselfgoverning/nonselfgoverning.shtml. 
3 Perhaps with the exception of New Caledonia: under the 1998 Noumea Accord, a referendum will be held 
between 2014 and 2019 to decide the future status of the territory. See Nic MacLellan “The Noumea Accord 
and Decolonisation in New Caledonia” (1999) 34 The Journal of Pacific History 245. With regards to the 
Falkland Islands, decolonisation is hampered by a territorial dispute. 
4 Since 1984, the only small territories to struggle and obtain full independence have been East Timor, 
Montenegro and Kosovo. See Godfrey Baldacchino “’Upside Down Decolonization’ in Subnational Island 
Jurisdictions: Questioning the ‘Post’ in Postcolonialism” (2010) 13(2) Space and Culture 188 at 192. 
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Cook Islands and Niue are analysed according to this conception. Taking the conclusions 
from this analysis, the final part of this paper proposes a model of constitution-making that is 
considered more appropriate for dependent non-self-governing island-states wishing to 
undergo constitutional change, while retaining ties with a larger external state.   
II Democratic Legitimacy and Constituent Power 
This paper defends a procedurally normative conception of democratic legitimacy in 
constitution-making - the criterion for which is the concept of popular constituent power.  
Constituent power, or constitution-making power, “is the political will, whose power or 
authority is capable of making the concrete, comprehensive decision over the type and form 
of its own political existence”.5 Writing during the French Revolution, Sieyès identified ‘the 
people’ or ‘the nation’ as the subjects of constituent power (le pouvoir constituant).6 In doing 
so, he heralded an important shift in constitutional theory. Where previously public power 
had relied on external sources of authority (ie religion) for legitimation, Sieyès demanded that 
the conscious willing of the people could provide that authority, stating that “[t]he national 
will ... never needs anything but its own existence to be legal. It is the source of all legality”.7 
Constitutional theory rests on an important distinction between constituent (constitution-
making) power and constituted (law-making) power. Constituted power (which includes 
executive, legislative and judicial authority) remains permanently subordinate to constituent 
power, which conversely can never be constrained nor exhausted. As explained by Schmitt:8  
All constitutionally constituted powers and competencies are based on the constitution-
making power. However it can never constitute itself in terms of constitutional law. The 
people, the nation, remains the origin of all political action, the source of all power… 
The connection between constituent power and democracy can be readily identified. 
Democracy requires that all citizens in a demos participate equally towards the creation of the 
laws to which they are subject. Popular constituent power demands that the collective 
citizenry be the authors of the institutions and rules that regulate their society – their 
constitution. By permanently locating the constitution-making power in those people bound 
by the constitution, the democratic nature of the constitutional regime is guaranteed.  As 
explained by Kalyvas, “precisely because the concept of the constituent sovereign resituates 
                                                
5 Carl Schmitt Constitutional Theory (Duke University Press, Durham, 2007) at 125. 
6 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès What is the Third Estate? (Pall Mall Press, London, 1963) at 58.  
7 At 126. 
8 Schmitt, above n 5, at 128 (emphasis added). 
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the normative ideals of political freedom and collective autonomy at the centre of democratic 
theory, it points at a distinctive theory of democratic legitimacy”.9  
Democratic legitimacy in constitution-making will therefore be assessed in this paper 
according to the extent to which a constitution can be seen as the manifestation of the 
political will of the people it purports to bind – or in other words, the manifestation of an 
exercise of popular constituent power.10  Popular constituent power “represents an ideal and 
pure type of democratic constitutional making.”11 Constitution-making however rarely occurs 
in ideal ‘textbook’ conditions, rather “the call for a new constitution usually arises in 
turbulent circumstances.”12 Reality thus demands that democratic legitimacy in constitution-
making be treated as a matter of degree.  
The conception of constitutional legitimacy advanced in this paper must be distinguished 
from other popular conceptions of legitimacy.13 A sociological conception judges the 
legitimacy of a constitution according to the extent to which the people it purports to bind 
perceive that the constitution is binding on them, and act accordingly.14 This conception is 
based on a Weberian understanding of legitimacy. Aside from the practical difficulties 
presented by assessing constitutional legitimacy on this conception, more importantly it is at 
odds with the idea of democratic legitimacy.15 A constitution imposed by an external power 
or dictatorial leader may be dutifully acquiesced to and even respected by the citizenry, but 
such a constitutional regime cannot be considered democratically legitimate.  
A moral conception of legitimacy would judge a constitution as legitimate insofar as its 
content accords with a set of morally acceptable principles. On a Rawlsian approach, such 
principles would be those “which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse”.16 At least to the extent that its assessment is based on the substance of a 
constitution, assessing legitimacy according to a set of principles is susceptible to the same 
democratic shortcoming as a sociological conception. If the constitution accords with a set of 
                                                
9 Andreas Kalyvas “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power” (2005) 12(5) Constellations 
223 at 237. 
10 The scope of this paper is limited to those instances of constitution-making where ‘the people’ is an already 
recognised entity (so it would not realistically apply to the Falkland Islands). Popular constituent power as a 
criterion for assessing democratic constitution-making presupposes a people or a nation. Where this is not 
already established (eg where a state’s borders are disputed), this criterion is of limited utility as it is difficult to 
identify ‘a people’ to give to themselves a constitution. The problem of ‘democratic beginnings’ arises. See 
generally Hans Agné “Democratic founding: We the people and the others” (2012) 10 Int J Const L 836; and 
Zoran Oklopcic “Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of 
Constitutional Orders in the Balkans” (2012) 19(1) Constellations 81. 
11 Kalyvas, above n 9, at 238. 
12 Jon Elster “Forces and Mechanisms in Constitution-Making” (1995) 45 Duke LJ 123 at 138. 
13 See generally David Beetham The Legitimation of Power (MacMillan Press, Hong Kong, 1991). 
14 Richard H Fallon Jr “Legitimacy and the Constitution” (2005) 118(6) Harvard Law Review 1787 at 1795-
1796.  
15 Joel Colón-Ríos “The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Constituent Power, Democracy, and the Limits of 
Constitutional Reform” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 199 at 214. 
16 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 2005) at 224. 
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acceptable principles, it would be democratically legitimate regardless of the process by 
which it came into being.   
In contrast, the concern of this paper is procedure at the level of constitution-making. It 
proceeds on the understanding that the founding of a political order is democratically 
legitimate if it is based on a constitutional regime which reflects the political will of the 
people, or is the result of a popular exercise of constituent power. It supports the contention, 
as advanced by Colón-Ríos, that “the basic condition for democratic legitimacy is the 
realization of democracy at the level of the fundamental law”.17 As ordinary laws draw their 
authority from fundamental law, a deficit of democracy with regards to the latter brings into 
question the democratic legitimacy of the whole constitutional order.18  
Though careful attention has been made here to distinguish between democracy at the level of 
constitution-making and democracy at the level a constitution’s operation, academics have 
repeatedly recognised the interlinked nature of these factors. As noted by Yash Ghai, “the 
capacity of the constitution to confer legitimacy upon the new system depends in 
considerable part on the process of its making and in particular the extent of the popular 
consultation and consensus on which it was based.”19 
III The Case Studies: The Cook Islands and Niue 
A Background 
The Cook Islands and Niue are two island states located in the South Pacific Ocean. By 
proclamation dated 10 June 1901 both were formally included within the boundaries of the 
“Colony of New Zealand”. 20 Though the Cook Islands and Niue accepted a shift towards 
self-government (with varying degrees of enthusiasm), it was New Zealand, not the colonies, 
that pushed for the latter to become self-governing following pressure from the United 
Nations (UN).21   
In 1960, New Zealand signed the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples (‘the Declaration’). The Declaration recognised that “all 
peoples have the right to … freely determine their political status”,22 and was based on an 
                                                
17Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 214.  
18 Joel Colón-Ríos “The Second Dimension of Democracy: The People and Their Constitution” (2009) 2(2) 
Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 1 at 9. 
19 Yash Ghai (ed) Law, Politics and Government in the Pacific Island States (Institute of Pacific Studies, 
University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1988) at 6. 
20 Cook Islands Boundaries and Inclusion in New Zealand Proclamation 1901.  
21 Godfrey Baldacchino “’Upside Down Decolonization’ in Subnational Island Jurisdictions: Questioning the 
‘Post’ in Postcolonialism” (2010) 13(2) Space and Culture 188 at 190. 
22 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples GA Res 1514, XV 
A/Res/1514 (1960) at art 2. 
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assumption that full independence, if given the option, would be the desired option of the 
world’s remaining colonies. It stated that: 23 
immediate steps shall be taken, in United Nations Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories 
or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the 
peoples of those territories. 
The Declaration left colonial powers little room to manoeuvre, stating that “inadequacy of 
political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for 
delaying independence”.24  
Having signed the Declaration, New Zealand felt an acute sense of pressure to comply with 
its terms as soon as possible.25 The local people of the Cook Islands and Niue did not 
however, as suggested in the Declaration, display an apparent “yearning for freedom”, nor 
was there any suggestion of a threat of “conflict resulting from the denial” of their freedom.26  
Rather, they explicitly demanded the maintenance of strong ties with New Zealand.  
To take account of this reality, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution later in 1960 
recognising alternative political arrangements (aside from full independence) that would 
afford the decolonising state the requisite full measure of self-government.27 On this basis, 
the New Zealand Minister of Island Territories presented a speech to the Cook Islands 
Legislative Assembly (CILA) in 1962 (which was later sent to the Niue Island Assembly 
(NIA)), on the colonies’ constitutional futures. The Assemblies were presented with four 
options: (1) full independence, (2) Polynesian federation, (3) integration with New Zealand or 
(4) internal self-government.28 The Minister expressed the view “that it would be in the best 
interests of the Cook Islands [and Niuean] people to keep the present link with New Zealand, 
but to have full internal self-government.”29 
In 1962, the CILA and NIA passed resolutions stating that internal self-government, rather 
than full independence, was their preference. Towards the attainment of that goal, the New 
Zealand government prepared “a programme for the future” – which included a timetable 
mapping out a careful transfer of power over the course of three years towards self-
                                                
23 Article 5. 
24 Article 3.  
25 Terry Chapman The Decolonisation of Niue (Victoria University Press and NZ Institute of International 
Affairs, Wellington, 1976) at 19.  
26 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, above n 22. 
27 The resolution recognised three decolonisation options: “A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have 
reached a full measure of self-government by: (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent state; (b) Free 
association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State.” Principles which should 
guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under 
Article 73e of the Charter  GA Res 1541, XV (1960). 
28 Sir Leon Gotz, Minister of Island Territories “Future Political Development” (speech to Cook Islands 
Legislative Assembly, Cook Islands, 11 July 1962). As reported in The Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the 
Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands (1962) at 101-108. 
29 At 105. 
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government. 30 The Cook Islands went ahead with constitutional change loosely according to 
New Zealand’s proposal. Niue, however, accepted internal self-government in principle, but 
demanded a more gradual approach. 
Pragmatic reasons ultimately informed the respective Assemblies’ rejection of full 
independence. At the time of decolonisation, both countries had very small populations which 
persist today.31 Niue, with just one island and a land mass of 260 square kilometres, has a 
total population of 1,600 people. The Cook Islands has a larger population of about 15,000 
people – but this population is spread throughout 15 islands scattered over approximately two 
million square kilometres of ocean. The small size, lack of natural resources and geographical 
isolation of these island-states at decolonisation meant that economic development was 
severely limited. Owing to heavy subsidies from the New Zealand government along with 
remittances from family in New Zealand however, neither countries’ living standards 
reflected this reality. When constitutional change was suggested in 1962 therefore, it is not 
surprising that the island-states’ future relationship with New Zealand was the main concern 
of the local people. 
B The Constitution-Making Processes 
1 The Colonial Administration 
Constitution-making in the Cook Islands and Niue were exercises in decolonisation.32 New 
Zealand, like its British counterparts, was less wed to constitutionalist ideas and treated the 
creation of a constitution as a practical way of transferring power over the institutions of a 
modern state to the local people.33  Decolonisation in both the Cook Islands and Niue was 
therefore characterised by careful transfers of executive and legislative power from the New 
Zealand government to the respective Cabinets formed from the newly constituted 
Assemblies. The implementation of policies to this end, however, preceded any formal steps 
toward self-government.  
From as early as 1956, the New Zealand government was invested in a programme of 
constitutional development.34 The policy was “directed towards equipping the Maoris with 
technical skills and administrative and political experience”.35 As the locals were seen to 
“have neither the political maturity nor the experience in modern government” to take full 
                                                
30 “Future Political Development” Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Paper No 18 (1963) (Presented by the 
President of the CILA “by direction of the Hon Minister of Island Territories”). 
31 The populations have changed little since decolonisation. Cook Islands: 14,974 (2011 resident) Niue: 1,625 
(2006 census). See: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “Pacific” 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/index.php. 
32 See Dietmar Rothermund “Constitution Making and Decolonization” (2006) 53 Diogenes 9. 
33 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger “Into the Heart of the State: Intervention through Constitution-Making” (1994) 8 
Temp Intl & Comp LJ 315 at 331; and Sara Kendall ''Constitutional Technicity'': Displacing Politics through 
Expert Knowledge” (2013) Law, Culture and the Humanities 1.   
34 This was consistent with the obligation on New Zealand under art 73 of the UN Charter to “develop self-
government” in its dependent territories.  
35 Colin Aikman “First Report on Constitutional Survey of the Cook Islands” 1 October 1956 at [6]. 
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responsibility,36 the process was to be gradual. As such, legislation leading up to the offer of 
decolonisation was passed to incrementally decrease the authority of the Resident 
Commissioner,37 while increasing the authority of the local legislative assemblies and the 
representation of elected members in them.38 As a result, Larmour explains:39 
Transfers at independence were generally a continuation of a process already underway. 
Almost everywhere, there were colonial bureaucracies and legislatures already in place. The 
constitution simply reframed the relationship between them, and added new elements to it.  
 
Further, as a result of years of policy pursued by the New Zealand government towards 
preparing the countries for self-government, the constituent power in these countries could be 
seen as ‘moulded’, or at least altered. The local people had been educated under the 
Administration in such a way that, at decolonisation, the colonial form of governance was 
seen as superior to former local systems. As a result, the resulting constitutions, even if the 
manifestation of popular constituent power, could be viewed as products of colonised popular 
constituent powers. This suggestion reflects a broader conclusion made by Yash Ghai that the 
independence constitutions of the Pacific can be seen as “recording and consolidating the 
final victory of the westernised, Christianised, urbanised elites, in control of the restructured 
formal state, distinguished by their increasing repudiation of traditional institutions.”40  
Every country has an inescapable history informing its political structure which, even if 
initially imposed, at some point must be treated as its own. The formative influence exerted 
by New Zealand as the administering power however, is important to understanding the latter 
constitutional developments in the Cook Islands and Niue. 
2 The Cook Islands 
The constitution-making process in the Cook Islands was, by all accounts, rapid – taking 
effect a mere three years after constitutional change was first suggested by the New Zealand 
government.41  
As already noted, the Minister of Island Territories presented the CILA with a speech 
concerning the country’s constitutional future in 1962. Though the Minister was clear that 
“the final decision will have to be made by the people of the Cook Islands”,42 he cited a 
                                                
36 At [48]. 
37 The chief executive officer of the colony. 
38 For example, the Cook Islands Amendment Act 1957 gave the respective legislative assemblies greater 
legislative authority, more seats for elected members, and control over revenue collected in the colony. 
39 Peter Larmour “Westminster Constitutions in the South Pacific: A “Policy Transfer” Approach” (2002) 10(1) 
Asian Journal of Political Science 39 at 47. 
40 Ghai, above n 19, at 49. 
41 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, sch 1. 
42 Sir Leon Gotz, Minister of Island Territories “Future Political Development” (speech to Cook Islands 
Legislative Assembly, Cook Islands, 11 July 1962), above n 28, at 106. 
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desire to “cooperate with the United Nations”43 and a feeling on the part of the Government 
“not to postpone matters too long.”44 Two days later, the CILA passed a resolution in favour 
of self-government.45 
After accepting the timetable prepared by the New Zealand government, the CILA requested 
expert assistance. Three advisers were chosen: Professor Aikman, Professor Davidson and 
Mr Wright.46 The advisers made one visit of nine days to the Cook Islands to assist in the 
constitutional discussions with the CILA. During these discussions, the Assembly suspended 
its standing orders to allow for the advisers to take part in the constitutional deliberations and 
enable longer sessions. The discussions between the CILA members and the advisers were 
broadcast on the radio and reported in detail in the Cook Islands News.47  
Following their visit, the three advisers prepared a report comprising 44 recommendations for 
constitutional change.48 The report stated that, as far as the advisers could judge, “the 
recommendations … for constitutional development are in full accordance with the wishes of 
the Cook Islands people, as expressed by ... their elected representatives.”49 The CILA 
subsequently approved the recommendations in the report, with only minor modifications.50  
This report formed the basis of the Constitution which was drafted in New Zealand in 
collaboration with the advisers. It was drafted in English and has never been translated into 
Cook Islands Māori. After passing its first reading in the New Zealand Parliament, the 
proposed Constitution was sent to the Select Committee on Island Territories sitting in 
Wellington.51 The Committee heard submissions from Cook Islanders resident in New 
Zealand and from the recently established Cook Islands (New Zealand) Society led by to-be 
Premier Mr Albert Henry. It also welcomed a delegation of four CILA members 
accompanied by the Resident Commissioner and two of the constitutional advisers.52  
                                                
43 At 104. 
44 At 106. 
45 Resolution of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly, 13 July 1962. 
46 Professor Aikman was Professor of Constitutional Law at Victoria University. Professor Davidson was 
Professor of Pacific History at Australia National University and had acted as adviser to the Government of 
Western Samoa preceding independence. Mr Wright had acted as High Commissioner for New Zealand in 
Western Samoa and Secretary of Island Territories. 
47 CC Aikman, JW Davidson and JB Wright “Report to the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the Cook 
Islands on Constitutional Development” (1999) 30 VUWLR 519 at 520. 
48 At 522. 
49 At 522. 
50 Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Paper No 45 (1963). 
51 The Select Committee, established on 10 August, 1964 met eleven times over period of a week, and recorded 
196 pages of typescript in the questioning of witnesses. The members included the Prime-Minister, the leader of 
the Opposition and Minister of Island Territories. Report of Evidence Given before Island Territories 
Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution Bill, Wednesday 23 Sept 1964. 
52 The delegation consisted of Hon D C Brown, Hon Makea Nui Teremoana Ariki, Hon David Hosking, Hon 
Naine Rere, and was accompanied by Mr Dare, the Resident Commissioner. Professor Aikman and Mr Wright 
were also in attendance. 
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The Cook Islands Constitution Act was passed by the New Zealand Parliament on 17 
November 1964. It was not subject to a referendum, but as stipulated in the Act, the 
Constitution was to come into force following the election of a new CILA.53 At the first 
meeting of the newly elected CILA, three resolutions were passed requesting that the New 
Zealand Parliament amend the Constitution.54 Having given effect to the requested 
amendments,55 self-government in the Cook Islands was proclaimed on 27 July 1965, to 
come into effect on 4 August 1965.56 
3 Niue 
The Constitution of Niue was the result of a much slower constitution-making process than 
that in the Cook Islands.57 Despite passing a resolution in 1962 accepting that self-
government was best for Niue (and asking that the other three alternatives be “buried 
forever”),58 the NIA demanded a “piecemeal” approach to constitutional development.59  
On receiving the timetable prepared by the New Zealand government outlining the steps to 
attaining self-government in 1963, the NIA requested expert assistance. In response, 
Professor Aikman and Mr McEwen travelled to Niue in 1965.60 During their stay, the 
advisers met with the Resident Commissioner, the NIA and 55 Niueans regarding 
constitutional development.61 It became apparent to them early on that the short time frames 
proposed in the timetable had created “a great deal of concern”.62 The advisers’ first report 
therefore suggested that any formal constitutional developments be set aside.63 
In 1969, the Assembly passed a motion to reconsider New Zealand’s proposal for 
constitutional change. To assist in this regard, Professor Quentin-Baxter took over as adviser 
to the NIA.64 At the outset, he made clear to the NIA that he “had not come to express a New 
Zealand viewpoint, or to tell the people of Niue what course they should follow” – he was 
rather to be “‘the Assembly’s man.’”65 
                                                
53 Cook Islands Constitution Act, s 1. The relevant election was held on 20 April 1965.  
54 The amendments included a change to the candidature rules for election to the CILA, a change to the number 
of Cabinet Ministers from five to seven, the establishment of a House of Arikis (to function as a consultative 
body), and changes to the role of the New Zealand High Commissioner to include acting as the representative of 
the Queen. See Cook Islands Constitution Amendment Act 1965. 
55 Cook Islands Constitution Amendment Act 1965 (passed on 7 June 1965).  
56 Cook Islands Constitution Act Commencement Order 1965, 1965/128. 
57 Niue Constitution Act 1974. 
58 Minutes from the Niue Island Assembly 23 August, 1962 at 12 [20].  
59 Chapman, above n 25, at 14. 
60 Professor Aikman had formerly advised the CILA on the Cook Islands Constitution (see above n 42). Mr 
McEwen was Secretary of Island Territories. 
61 CC Aikman and JM McEwan “A Report to the Minister of Island Territories on the Constitutional 
Development of Niue” 1965. 
62 At 2[5]. 
63 At 2[6]. 
64 RQ Quentin Baxter was a Professor of Law at Victoria University of Wellington. 
65 RQ Quentin-Baxter “Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue” [1971] 
AJHR A4 at 5 [1]. 
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During his stay, Professor Quentin-Baxter met with members of the NIA, the Executive 
Committee, the Niue Development Board, representative groups from the Public Service, the 
Resident Commissioner and locals through “well-attended village meetings in all parts of the 
island.”66 Again, the people’s fears were made clear. The NIA reiterated that “the Assembly 
itself was by no means committed to the view that there should be any further constitutional 
changes in the immediate future.”67 In light of this, the first report by Professor Quentin-
Baxter recommended that the New Zealand government “change nothing which might 
undermine the confidence of the Niuean people.”68 Formal constitutional development was 
again put on hold.  
Professor Quentin-Baxter’s second report of 1974 however expressed a changed atmosphere. 
Since his first visit, several developments had occurred in Niue that had contributed to a 
sense of confidence and positivity on the island. In June 1972, Niue received a UN Visiting 
Mission. As a direct result of this visit, the Select Committee on Constitutional Development, 
which had been set up in 1971, sprang into action. The Committee – comprised of all of the 
Executive Committee and two other members of the NIA – heard submissions from the 
public which informed the eventual establishment of a timetable towards self-government. 
This timetable went on to attain not only the approval of the New Zealand government, but 
that of the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly. Having noted that constitutional 
development was no longer “paralysed by the people’s deep anxiety”,69 Professor Quentin-
Baxter recommended that the constitution be prepared at the request of the NIA.  
The Constitution, which was drafted in New Zealand, was informed by Professor Quentin-
Baxter’s second report. After passing its first reading in the New Zealand Parliament, the 
Select Committee charged with receiving submissions on the proposed Constitution sat in 
both Wellington and Niue.70 Following generally positive feedback, the New Zealand 
Parliament passed the Niue Constitution Act on 29 August 1974, to come into effect 
following an affirmative popular referendum. On September 3, 1974, 65.4% voted in favour 
of Niue's new constitutional arrangements, with 34.6% against.71 The Constitution entered 
into force by Proclamation on 19 October, 1974.72   
C The Constitutions 
The Constitutions are Schedules to Acts of the New Zealand Parliament that were made part 
of the law of both New Zealand and the Cook Islands and Niue respectively. The Acts 
                                                
66 At 5 [2]. 
67 At 6 [6]. 
68 A 20 [61]. 
69 RQ Quentin-Baxter “Second Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue” 
(1999) 30 VUWLR 577 at 580. 
70 Alison Quentin-Baxter “Making Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser” (2002) 33 
VUWLR 237 at 260. 
71 Voter turnout for the referendum was 97%. See Report of the United Nations Special Mission to Observe the 
Act of Self-Determination in Niue XXII A/9623/Add 5 (1974). 
72 Niue Constitution Act Commencement Order 1974, 1974/286.  
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conferred plenary powers on the respective governments of the Cooks Islands and Niue. By 
passing these Acts, the New Zealand Parliament irrevocably removed its power to legislate 
for its former colonies – thereby establishing the Cook Islands and Niue as fully internally 
self-governing states. Though the New Zealand Parliament could amend the Acts by simple 
majority, such amendments would only have effect in New Zealand (and would be breach 
constitutional convention).73 Amendments made to the Constitution Acts by the CILA or NIA 
are not made to the respective New Zealand Acts. 
The Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue share, at least at a superficial level, many 
similarities.  In both instances, what can be readily identified as the Constitution is contained 
in a Schedule to an Act of the New Zealand Parliament. The Constitutions provide for self-
government,74 while allowing for continued association with New Zealand under a common 
Head of State (the Queen in Right of the Realm of New Zealand),75  common New Zealand 
citizenship,76 and a continuing responsibility on the part of New Zealand for the states’ 
external affairs and defence.77 The Constitutions further establish a parliamentary system of 
government, with responsibility for executive authority vested in a Cabinet of Ministers 
chosen from a fully elected Legislative Assembly and headed by the Premier.  
Owing to the island-states’ unique characteristics and constitution-making processes, there 
are of course several notable differences between the Constitutions. The most prominent for 
the purposes of this paper relate to the ongoing relationship of the Cook Islands and Niue 
with New Zealand. The Niue Constitution Act includes a provision for ongoing “necessary 
economic and administrative assistance to Niue” from New Zealand,78 and regular 
consultation between the two governments.79  The Cook Islands Constitution lacks any such 
provisions.  
                                                
73 The Constitution of Niue does leave open the possibility for the New Zealand Parliament to amend its 
Constitution with the NIA’s request and consent (art 36), but this provision has not been used for several 
decades.   The Cook Islands Constitution originally had a similar provision, but this was repealed in 1980 – 
thereby removing any ability for the New Zealand Parliament to legislate for the Cook Islands. 
74 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 s 3, Niue Constitution Act 1974 s 3.  
75 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 s 2, Niue Constitution Act 1974 s 1. See Letters Patent Constituting the 
Office of Governor-General of New Zealand (28 October 1983), SR 1983/225 (as amended SR 1987/8 and SR 
2006/224). See generally Laws of New Zealand “Pacific States and Territories: Cook Islands” (online ed) at 
[29]; and Elisabeth Perham “Citizenship laws in the Realm of New Zealand” (2011) 9 The New Zealand 
Yearbook of International Law 219.  
76 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 s 6, Niue Constitution Act 1974 s 5. 
77 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 s 5, Niue Constitution Act 1974 s 6. 
78 Niue Constitution Act 1974, s 7. 
79 Section 8. 
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IV External Influence and Democratic Legitimacy  
A Classical (Strict) Conception of Constituent Power 
As argued earlier in this paper, a constitutional regime is democratically legitimate insofar it 
can be seen as a manifestation of a popular exercise of constituent power. The “axiom of 
political philosophy and constitutional theory”, Preuss explains, is that “the normative force 
of constitutions rests upon the constituent power of the people”.80 Strictly understood, 
constituent power theory dictates that, as outsiders will not be bound by the resulting 
constitutional regime, their involvement detracts from the process’ democratic legitimacy.  
A strict conception of popular constituent power is dominant in classical constitutional 
theory. Sieyès, the father of constituent power theory, implicitly excludes a role for outsiders 
in the constitution-making process by identifying the ‘nation’ as the exclusive source of 
constituent power. As explained by Schmitt, in a democracy, “[t]he people are the bearer of 
the constitution-making power and, as such, grant themselves their constitution.”81 Kalyvas 
builds on this notion stating that “constituent power demands that those who are subject to a 
constitutional order co-institute it.”82As explained by Agné, “the critical, though not always 
explicit, assumption in this literature is that only those can exercise legitimate constituent 
powers who will become citizens in the future state.”83  
On a strict conception of popular constituent power, it is clear that, given New Zealand’s 
involvement, the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue would be considered (to varying 
degrees) the products of processes lacking in democratic legitimacy. This conclusion may be 
fair; there is much to criticise in relation to the constitution-making processes in the Cook 
Islands and Niue. To base this conclusion simply on the existence of external influence in the 
constitution-making process is, however, problematic.  
At decolonisation, the Cook Islands and Niue attached “the highest importance” to the 
maintenance of their association with New Zealand.84 They explicitly sought to retain New 
Zealand citizenship and assurances that they would continue receiving economic and 
administrative assistance. A role for New Zealand was therefore to be expected in the 
constitution-making episodes of the Cook Islands and Niue, not just because of the era and a 
possible lingering colonial mind-set, but also because of the on-going political relationship 
sought.  
                                                
80 Ulrich K Preuss “Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change Through 
External Constitutionalization” (2006/07) 51 NYL Sch L Rev 467 at 468.  
81 Schmitt, above n 5, at 225. 
82 Kalyvas, above n 9, at 238. 
83 Hans Agné “Democratic founding: We the people and the Others” (2012) 10 Int J Const L 836 at 852 
(emphasis added). 
84 Aikman, Davidson and Wright, above n 47, at 521[5]. Similarly expressed by Quentin-Baxter regarding Niue. 
He notes that “the most important question for Niue will always be its relationship with New Zealand”.  See RQ 
Quentin-Baxter, “Second Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue”, 
above n 69, at 578. 
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The involvement of New Zealand in the constitution-making processes of Cook Islands and 
Niue could be disregarded today as something from a bygone era; as examples of the final 
gasps of colonisation before the world entered a more enlightened age where such 
intervention is considered simply inappropriate. On such a view, the existence of external 
influence in these processes would not be seen as challenging the applicability of a strict 
conception of popular constituent power. If anything, the case studies would be treated as 
affirming the normative value of this conception as a conclusion that the processes lacked 
democratic legitimacy would accord with a sense that something was amiss in these cases.  
A cursory glance over the extent of external influence in modern constitution-making 
however warns against any hasty conclusions to that effect. As explained by Kendall, 
“contemporary constitution-making practices offer a contrasting view of the ontology of 
constitutions themselves, of who and what they represent, and of the symbolic relationship 
between the constituting power and what is constituted”.85 The orientation of ‘constitutional 
civility’,86 which informed the processes in the Cook Islands and Niue, takes a new form 
today as ‘democracy promotion’, ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘transitional justice’. Recent 
constitution-making episodes, such as those in Iraq,87 Bosnia-Herzegovina,88 East Timor and 
Sudan,89 reveal the extent to which external actors are often involved in the process. Be it 
through the offering of expert advice or through the determination of the constitution’s 
procedural or substantive framework – external actors consistently have a part to play in 
modern constitution-making. This has led Dann and Al’Ali to suggest the emergence of an 
“internationalised pouvoir constituant”.90 As explained by Preuss, no longer can state 
constitutions be considered (if they ever could) as “purely domestic instruments of 
government of a nation-bound population which exercises its right to national self-
determination without concern of its regional or global surroundings.”91  
The constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue are unique and alone may not 
demand a reconceptualization of popular constituent power. The nature of modern 
constitutional practice alongside these case studies however does. To accept a classical 
                                                
85 Sara Kendall, above n 33, at 2. 
86‘Constitutional civility’ is a constitutional orientation that often informed the creation of 
decolonisation/independence constitutions. A constitution is treated by a departing colonial power as a means of 
establishing modern state institutions in their image in the colony. See Sara Kendall, above n 33, at 2.  
87 See Noah Feldman, “Imposed Constitutionalism” (2004-2005) 37 Conn L Rev 857; Andrew Arato 
Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq (Colombia University 
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(strict) understanding of popular constituent power requires accepting that not only the case 
studies, but also many examples of modern constitution-making, fall outside the analytical 
ambit of constitutional theory. A failure to operate as an analytical tool in reality risks 
rendering constitutional theory irrelevant – and thus a strict conception of constituent power 
must be rejected.  
B Enlarged (Loose) Conception of Constituent Power 
Recognising the gap between constitutional theory and the realities of constitution-making, 
Oklopcic has advanced an argument in favour of “enlarging” constituent power beyond the 
people to reflect the “multiplicity of constituent powers, not only from within, but also from 
without”.92  
Following an analysis of external actors in the constitutional experiences of the Balkan states, 
Oklopcic posits that the number of constituent powers involved in a constitution-making 
episode must be pluralised and enlarged beyond the people. Drawing on Loughlin’s concept 
of political prudence,93 Oklopcic argues that enlarging the notion of constituent power to 
include external actors would amount to a necessary ‘prudential attunement’ of theory with 
reality. A re-imagining of constituent power would involve perceiving the constituent not as 
just the people, but as “an assemblage of political powers”.94 The fundamental link between 
the people and constituent power would thus be severed.   
Such an ‘attunement’ finds support in the sociological approach to understanding constituent 
power advanced by Thornhill.95 Through his analysis of the theory of constituent power in 
the context of a perceived emergent transnational constitution, Thornhill argues that a 
literalistic understanding of the relation between political concepts and the political system 
must be abandoned to make way for a more sociologically adaptive approach. By linking 
classical (strict) conceptions of constituent power to a political need in the 18th century to 
produce constitutional legitimacy without reliance on external principles or social 
attachments, Thornhill explains why the concept was necessarily limited to the people and 
why, in view of the ‘post-state transnational order’, it need not necessarily remain so.  
Constituent power is a political concept that ought to be capable of evolution to reflect 
political reality; fossilising the concept risks rendering it relevant only to academics. There is 
however a real risk that the normative value of popular constituent power will be hollowed 
out if expanded beyond the people. Oklopcic recognises that enlarging constituent power 
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involves “an obvious and unarticulated tradeoff”.96 He explains: “what we acquire in our 
prudential attunement to the realities of external constituent influence, we lose on the side of 
normative and rhetorical benefits stemming from the vocabulary of constituent power of the 
sovereign people.”97 He argues however that a recalibration of theory with reality should not 
be frustrated by normative concerns – asserting that “there is no reason why constitutional 
theory should be invested in a particular normative programme”.98 Contrary to this claim, 
there appears to be very good reasons for constitutional theory to be invested in some form of 
normative programme. 
By directly connecting the citizen to the constitution, popular constituent power provides a 
powerful rhetoric in support of a participative and active citizenry committed to constitutional 
enforcement. Violations of the constitution are more likely to be challenged, rendering the 
constitution more effective.99 As it always remains with the people, popular constituent 
power can act as a constant reminder to national leaders that they, and the pouvoir constitué 
in general, ultimately remain subject to the will of the people. At the international level, 
recognition that the people, the nation, are the only holders of constituent power sends a 
strong message to powerful states to exercise restraint before considering intervening in the 
constitution-making episodes of foreign countries.100 
Oklopcic helpfully draws our attention to a gap between theory and reality and opens the way 
to reconceptualise constituent power. In deeply divided and territorially unstable states, such 
as those in the Balkans, his argument deserves particular attention. There is a need to accept 
and account for the fact that external actors can strongly influence the constitution-making 
process. To fail to do so leaves open the potential for abuse and risks rendering constitutional 
literature irrelevant. By severing the link between constituent power and the people however, 
Oklopcic ultimately goes too far. To retain the valuable normative benefits of popular 
constituent power, it must remain in the hands of the people who will be bound by the 
resulting constitutional regime.  
C A Flexible Conception of Constituent Power: Towards a New Analytical 
Framework 
In order to recognise and make space for external actors in the constitution-making process 
while retaining the normative benefits of popular constituent power – a strict exclusionary 
conception of popular constituent power and a loose conception that severs the link between 
constituent power and the people must be rejected. A democratically legitimate constitutional 
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regime requires that the people subject to that regime co-institute it. There is nothing implicit 
in this requirement however, that demands the exclusion of external actors. Recognising a 
role for external actors in constitution-making does not require departing from the 
fundamentals of constitutional theory. It does however require a more nuanced understanding 
of how constituent power is exercised.  
Constitutional theory excludes external influence in the constitution-making process because 
it is seen as displacing a popular (or internal) exercise of constituent power. Where external 
influence is not carefully managed such a displacement will likely occur, but this will not 
necessarily be the case. The people’s capacity to exercise constituent power is not decreased 
simply because an external actor has influenced the constitution-making process; the 
existence of one is not necessarily at the expense of the other. Agné explains:101 
That actor A affects actor B does not by itself mean that there are fewer or less important 
possibilities of action available to B, nor that B is prevented from performing any particular 
action. The effect caused by A may indeed have been to increase B’s possibilities to act 
freely. 
Take for example the instance of a small state with limited resources, the citizens of which 
have expressed a desire for constitutional change. The provision of aid by an external actor to 
fund an information campaign, a consultation process, and a referendum will undoubtedly 
influence the process - but may have the positive effect of enabling public participation where 
it otherwise may not have been possible.  
Rather than falling back on generalised verdicts, an assessment of the democratic legitimacy 
of external influence in constitution-making requires a particularised assessment. The focus 
needs to be on the effect the relevant external actor/state had on the exercise of popular 
constituent power. To aid in this assessment, a distinction needs to be made between cases of 
external exercise of and external influence on constituent power. If the intervention of an 
external actor amounts to an exercise of constituent power – the democratic legitimacy of the 
process will be compromised. If, however, an external actor simply influences a popular 
exercise of constituent power – the process’ democratic legitimacy will be unharmed and 
may even be enhanced.   
There is no clear point at which external influence becomes an external exercise of 
constituent power; the complexity of constitution-making means that it is more likely to fall 
somewhere along a spectrum.102 Dann and Al’Ali identify three categories of external 
influence along this spectrum: marginal, partial and total. ‘Marginal influence’ occurs when 
an external actor is involved but control over the process and substance remains in the hands 
of the people (eg when a state seeks constitutional advice). In such instances, the popular 
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constituent power could easily be recognised as having been influenced. Conversely, ‘total 
influence’ occurs when an external actor takes control of the constitution-making process to 
such a degree that the people’s constituent power is completely displaced. In such cases, the 
effect is a clear external exercise of constituent power – or imposition. In the grey area 
between these poles is the ‘partial influence’ of constituent power. In such cases, “the pouvoir 
constituant is neither entirely surrendered nor is it kept entirely intact. Instead, control over 
the constitutional process is shared.”103  In these cases, it becomes less clear whether 
constituent power is exercised by an external actor or power, or simply influenced.  
Adopting a more nuanced understanding of constituent power raises a fresh series of critical 
questions. To identify when external influence becomes an external exercise of constituent 
power, it is necessary to have some idea of what actually counts as an exercise of constituent 
power. There is a need to ask: what aspects of the process must be in the hands of the people 
to allow a conclusion that there was an exercise of popular constituent power? Or as 
questioned by Preuss: “what conditions must be fulfilled in order that it is ‘the people’ which 
we can recognise as the true author of the constitution and consequently, the source of its 
normative validity?”104 
Schmitt provides helpful guidance in this regard. In relation to the Weimar Constitution, 
Schmitt identifies certain “fundamental political decisions” that formed the Constitution’s 
basis.105 Those decisions pertaining to whether Germany would be a republic or a monarchy, 
a federal or unitary system, or a parliamentary or presidential system – were all fundamental 
to the resulting constitutional regime. The determination of the Constitution’s fundamental 
principles was similarly so.106 Together, these decisions defined the “people’s form of 
political existence and thus constitute[d] the fundamental prerequisites for all subsequent 
norms”.107  
For Schmitt:108 
[t]he political decision reached regarding the type and form of state existence, which 
constitutes the substance of the constitution, is valid … because the subject of the 
constitution-making power determines the type and form of this existence.  
Because in a democracy the subject of the constitution-making power is the people, it is them 
that must determine the fundamental political decisions of their constitution for it to be 
democratically legitimate. A popular exercise of constituent power requires that the 
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fundamental political decisions are determined by the people. In cases where an external 
actor determines one or several such decisions, an external exercise of constituent power can 
be said to have occurred.  
Difficulty may arise, however, when determining who ultimately determined a constitution’s 
fundamental political decisions. To help in this regard, the literature on constitution-making 
identifies certain procedures and mechanisms that are seen as necessary for the constitution to 
be considered a product of a popular exercise of constituent power (ie democratically 
legitimate).109 Though academic views diverge as to the finer details, there is general 
consensus that democratic constitution-making requires a desire ‘from below’ to undergo 
constitutional change,110 open and participative constitutional deliberations led by an elected 
constitution-making body, and ratification by the people (state citizens) of the final proposed 
constitution. Where these procedures are followed, it becomes possible to conclude that the 
fundamental political decisions encapsulated in the final constitution reflect the political will 
of the people. Conversely, their absence leaves open the possibility of an external exercise of 
constituent power.  
A general mainstay for the popular exercise of constituent power is that the people, in 
exercising their constituent power, have choice.  An external actor that decides what is best 
for another state and proceeds to impose that displaces the people’s constitution-making 
power – regardless of the virtue of what is imposed. As explained by Preuss, “[i]mposition 
means degrading the people to a thoroughly passive and subaltern status which is exactly 
what constitutionalism is supposed to overcome in the first place.”111   
 
If it is found that external influence did not amount to an exercise of constituent power, but 
rather just an influence – the effect this influence had on the process overall still requires 
attention.  Given that constitution-making ought to be a national exercise (and the risks 
associated with external actors exercising constituent power), unless external influence 
enhances a popular exercise of constituent power it ought to be discouraged.  
Agné explains how external intervention in constitution-making can “enhance internal 
abilities”. By defining autonomy as the “capacity of individuals to reflect on, and to choose 
among, alternative and widely different courses of action in their individual as well as 
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collective life”,112 Agné argues that an external actor enhances their constituent power by 
contributing to the range of constitutional alternatives available to the people.113 Take for 
example the external adviser who offers alternative political models that accord with the 
people’s desired political order. The adviser’s input can be seen as having enhanced the 
people’s autonomy by making available to them a greater range of constitutional options they 
may not otherwise have considered. In turn, the people are better able to contribute to the 
making of the constitution’s fundamental political decisions – and thus to exercise their 
constituent power.  
Finally, an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of the constitution should not be limited 
to the initial constitution-making episode. Even under a constitution initially created by an 
external exercise of constituent power, a people could reclaim its constituent power by 
amending the constitution (or by deciding not to amend it while having the power to do so). 
An analysis of democratic legitimacy in constitution-making should therefore extend to 
whether the people have subsequently “become authors of their constitution, even if they 
were not so when the constitution was originally created.”114  This is based on the 
understanding that the “constitution-making power is not thereby expended and eliminated, 
because it was exercised once.”115  
 
There are several benefits to accepting a more nuanced conception of popular constituent 
power that underpins the analytical framework advanced above. There is the obvious 
advantage that it is more responsive to reality. By recognising that external influence is not 
necessarily democratically attenuating - a more insightful analysis of the external influence 
and the effect that it had on the process becomes possible. It further allows for recognition of 
the value that can be added to the constitution-making process by involving outsiders.  
There are however negatives associated with rejecting a strict conception of popular 
constituent power. By maintaining that constituent power must be exercised by the people to 
be democratically legitimate, the approach is more restrictive than that advanced by the likes 
of Oklopcic.  In fact, it is true that on this approach it is likely that most external interventions 
will be considered damaging to the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process. 
This simply reflects the reality that democracy requires that people ought to have the power 
to determine the constitutional regime under which they live. There is still value in an 
approach which invites external and internal actors alike to interrogate the effect of any 
external influence before this conclusion is made. 
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A more compelling critique is that a flexible conception introduces ambiguity to the role of 
external actors in the constitution-making process. A clear-cut approach like that provided for 
by a strict conception of popular constituent power makes it easier to identify inappropriate 
(democratically damaging) input (ie any external influence). The practical consequence of 
such an approach is that it sends a stronger message to outsiders not to get involved in what 
should be a national and citizen-driven exercise. Though this is a valid concern, strict rules 
are incompatible with the fundamentally political exercise that is constitution-making.  
V Analysing the Case Studies 
Based on the discussion in the preceding section, the analytical framework on which the case 
studies will be assessed involves asking two key questions in the alternative. Firstly: were the 
people of the Cook Islands and Niue responsible for the fundamental political decisions in the 
respective constitution-making processes? If so, did New Zealand’s role in the processes 
enhance the people’s capacity to make those decisions – and thus their constituent power? If 
not, have the people subsequently reclaimed their constituent power? 
The circumstances surrounding the constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue 
raise issues of partial influence. New Zealand did not unilaterally write the respective 
Constitutions, nor did it remain completely absent from the processes. It did however 
recognise a role for itself in the constitution-making process of its colonies. Alison Quentin-
Baxter, assistant to the NIA’s constitutional adviser, explains:116  
As administering authority, the New Zealand Government saw itself as having a 
responsibility and a right to contribute to the decision-making. The people of Niue wished to 
remain New Zealand citizens, and were seeking a relationship of free association with New 
Zealand. As a term of this relationship, New Zealand would have a continuing responsibility 
to provide necessary economic and administrative assistance to Niue. 
Because of the dependent nature of the relationship and the on-going political ties sought - 
there was considerable scope for New Zealand to wield significant influence, directly or 
indirectly, over the constitutional deliberations of the Cook Islands and Niue.   
To ascertain what effect New Zealand did have, it is necessary to return to the constitution-
making processes in the Cook Islands and Niue.  
A Cook Islands 
The Cook Islands was generally enthusiastic about the prospect of self-government. There 
was certainly concern regarding what self-government meant for the states’ future 
relationship with New Zealand. However following assurances that assistance would 
                                                
116 Alison Quentin-Baxter “Making Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser”, above n 
70, at 248. 
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continue, the people embraced constitutional change much more readily than Niue. 
Somewhat paradoxically, this resulted in the people of the Cook Islands having less control 
over the constitution-making process and its corresponding fundamental political decisions. 
The substantive and procedural limitations placed on the constitutional deliberations by 
accepting the New Zealand government’s timetable for self-government, coupled with lack of 
public participation throughout, led to outsiders being able to take the lead in the process and 
ultimately determining key fundamental political decisions. 
 
Having instigated the constitution-making process in the Cook Islands, New Zealand 
proceeded to exert significant influence throughout the process by providing what became the 
framework for constitutional development and deliberations. After the CILA passed a 
resolution requesting “that the New Zealand Government proceed with its plan for giving the 
Cook Islands the fullest (possible degree of) internal self-government”,117 New Zealand 
prepared a timetable “for future political development”.118 The timetable set out steps for a 
gradual handover of power – accounting for a withdrawal of the official members in the 
Legislative Assembly (1964), the establishment of a Cabinet (1964), the appointment of the 
Resident Commissioner as constitutional Head of State (1965), the establishment of an 
Executive Council (1965) and a final increase in legislative powers (1965).  
 
By choosing to base the CILA constitutional deliberations on this timetable, the issues 
discussed ultimately revolved around these proposals.119 The proposals were only intended to 
guide discussion, but given that the advisers only had five days to discuss the constitution 
with the CILA, there was not sufficient time to fully explore alternatives. In addition, the 
advisers’ tended to lead the discussions. For each step, they described the proposal, the 
possible alternatives and often, at this point, their own view on the matter.  The advisers 
undoubtedly sought to advance the Cook Islanders’ interests by offering their considered 
opinion. However, in addition to the (somewhat unavoidable) limitations stemming from an 
adviser’s background,120  their lack of interaction with the local people significantly limited 
the degree to which their advice can be seen as responsive the political will of the people. 
Throughout the constitution-making process, there was little opportunity for the people of the 
Cook Islands to be directly involved. The geography of the Cook Islands made this a 
                                                
117 Resolution of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly 13 July 1962.  
118 “Future Political Development” Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Paper No 18 (1963) at 3. 
119 Minutes from the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly 23 August, 1963. 
120 As explained by Alison Quentin-Baxter, “a constitutional adviser's proposals are likely to be circumscribed 
by his or her own background, knowledge, and personal philosophy.” See Alison Quentin-Baxter “Making 
Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser”, above n 70, at 273. This was accepted by 
Professor Aikman, when he explained that “[i]t was expected that constitutional change in the territories for 
which New Zealand is responsible should be seen in terms of the parliamentary or Westminster system of 
government. That is the system with which we were familiar and from the earliest days of constitutional changes 
in Western Samoa and the Cook Islands the advisers involved have looked at British colonial precedents.” See 
CC Aikman “Recent Constitutional Changes in The South—West Pacific” in The New Zealand Yearbook 
(1968) (online ed) <http://www3.stats.govt.nz/New_Zealand_Official_Yearbooks/1968/NZOYB_1968.html>. 
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particular challenge - the distance between the 15 islands is immense and transport at the time 
was infrequent. Being aware of these constraints, efforts were made by the Cook Islands 
Government to ensure that the islanders were informed of the constitutional developments. 
The discussions in the CILA were recorded and subsequently broadcast on the radio and 
reported in considerable detail in the Cook Islands News.121 Further, the advisers’ report 
(which formed the basis of the draft Constitution) was translated into Māori and delivered to 
each island.122 The problem however lay in the lack of opportunity for the people to 
communicate their views back to the constitution-making body. As conceded by the Resident 
Commissioner at the time, at no point were the villagers invited to make submissions on the 
advisers’ report or any later draft constitution.123 The proposed Constitution was considered 
by a Select Committee in Wellington (at which no interpreters were present).124  And though 
a delegation of CILA Members travelled to attend the Committee hearing, the advisers 
answered many of the questions put to the delegates because of their “technical” nature.125   
 
Finally, despite the New Zealand Government’s having indicated in 1962 that once a plan for 
self-government had been prepared, “a plebiscite would be arranged to see if the plan was 
acceptable to the people as a whole”,126 the Constitution was never subject to a popular 
referendum. When asked about this in the New Zealand Parliament, the Prime Minister 
explained that, while the Government had no objection to a referendum, the people of the 
Cook Islands had not requested one.127 The problem with this approach is that there was not 
much opportunity for the people to ask.  
                                                
121 Aikman, Davidson and Wright, above n 47 at 520. 
122 Aikman, Davidson and Wright, above n 47 at 520. The report noted that as a result of the Government’s 
efforts, “a significant section of the people throughout the Cook Islands became acquainted with the various 
problems under consideration.” 
123 Mr Rata (Select Committee member): “There was no provision for the Assembly to hear opinions on that 
Report?” Mr Dare (Resident Commissioner): “We have never advertised that anybody could come along and 
make submissions to the Assembly or any special committee.” See Report of Evidence Given before Island 
Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution Bill, Wednesday 23 
September 1964 at 89.  
124 David Stone “Self-Determination in the Cook Islands: A Reply” (1965) 74(3) The Journal of the Polynesian 
Society 360 at 364. 
125 This prompted Sir Leslie Munro (member of the Select Committee) to ask about the meaning in the 
constitution’s clause referring to the making of laws having extra-territorial operation. Professor Aikman 
(adviser) replied, “With respect, I wonder whether that is a fair question. I doubt if many members of this 
committee really understand what is meant by this highly technical question of extra-territorial jurisdiction.” To 
which Sir Leslie Munro explained: “I asked it as a very general question because I want to know whether these 
good and important people have an idea of what the Constitution Bill really means. I know perfectly well that 
Mr Dare, Professor Aikman and Mr Wright can explain this Bill.” Report of Evidence Given before Island 
Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution Bill, Wednesday 23 
September 1964 at 17. 
126 Sir Leon Gotz, Minister of Island Territories “Future Political Development” (speech to Cook Islands 
Legislative Assembly, Cook Islands, 11 July 1962), above n 28, at 106. 
127 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1964, No 23 at 2836. 
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To satisfy the UN requirement that associated status was “the result of a free and voluntary 
choice”,128 a general election was arranged to be held before the Constitution came into force 
in place of a referendum. 129 The idea was that, as the Constitution was to be a central election 
issue, electors would have the chance to vote for candidates according to whether they 
supported the Constitution or not. Whether the election can be said to have had an effect 
similar to that of a referendum is however far from clear. The candidates who campaigned in 
support of a different variation of the proposed Constitution were defeated, but this was only 
7 out of the 66.130 Furthermore, being a general election, the Constitution was not the only 
issue informing voters’ choices.131 
It is clear from the minutes of CILA’s constitutional deliberations that certain fundamental 
political decisions were made by its Members. That the Cook Islands was to operate as a 
democracy with the Queen as the Head of State – was firmly supported in the discussions.132  
Other decisions on proposals that the CILA were less familiar with, however, can be less 
clearly attributed to the Members owing to the advisers’ approach. In discussions relating to 
the functioning of Cabinet government, what the advisers expressed “was the best way”, or 
the option “they ought to take”, were eventually agreed upon by the members.133  
 
What was clearly not fully determined by the CILA, however, was the initial decision to 
become a self-governing state in free association with New Zealand. When the CILA was 
first presented with four options for constitutional change in 1962, the decision to become 
self-governing in free association with New Zealand was swiftly made by the Members of the 
Assembly, without consulting their constituents.134 The CILA was fully elected, and on that 
basis the people could be seen as having made this decision indirectly. As became 
subsequently apparent however, the Members themselves did not fully understand what they 
were voting in favour of. When the advisers arrived at the CILA the following year, one 
member sought clarification as to what internal self-government actually meant. Joining in on 
                                                
128 Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Article 73e of the Charter  GA Res 1541, XV (1960), Annex, Principle VII(a). 
129 Report of Evidence Given before Island Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands 
Constitution Bill, Wednesday 23 Sept 1964 at 92-93. See also David J Stone “Self-Rule in the Cook Islands: 
The Government and Politics of a New Micro-State” (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1971). 
130 Stone “Self-Determination in the Cook Islands: A Reply” above n 124, at 368. 
131 The UN subcommittee was, however, of the opinion that the general election (to be observed by the UN) and 
the subsequent decision in the CILA, would constitute an “identifiable act of self-determination.” Report of Sub-
Committee II of the Special Committee of 24, 1964 at 9. 
132 Minutes from the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly 29 August, 1963. 
133 For example, the advisers advised adopting the Cabinet system instead of the Committee system, having the 
Premier select Cabinet members instead of having a voting system, and having a smaller Cabinet (five 
members) instead of the preferred larger membership. In each instance, the CILA went on to agree with the 
advisers. Even in the instance that they did not (in relation to the number of Cabinet members), the advisers’ 
view was that which was encapsulated in the report. See Minutes of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly 19, 
26 and 27 August, 1963.  
134 Angus Ross (ed) New Zealand’s Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century (Longman Paul Ltd, 
Auckland, 1969) at 108.  
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this question, another member noted that: "It is true the people do not truly understand the 
four doors [options] - there is a need for explanation."135  
 
The procedural and substantive constraints on the constitutional deliberations in the Cook 
Islands, coupled with the lack of public participation at every stage of the process, resulted in 
fundamental political decisions being overly influenced by New Zealand officials and 
advisers. As a result, New Zealand can be seen as having exercised a degree of constituent 
power in the Cook Islands – at the expense of the people’s. 
Before concluding on the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes in the 
Cook Islands – it is necessary to consider its constitutional experience following the creation 
of the Constitution. Before the Constitution even entered into force, the CILA requested that 
the New Zealand Parliament make several amendments. The impetus for the hasty request 
was that the to-be Premier, Mr Albert Henry, was excluded from running for election due to 
the candidate rules. Along with amending the candidature rules, the amendment also provided 
for the creation of a consultative body of traditional leaders – the ‘House of Arikis’, which 
had been largely excluded from the initial Constitution.136  Since then, the Cook Islands 
Constitution has been amended 30 times, and “now differs markedly from the version enacted 
in 1965.”137 Amendments have included those to remove the power of the New Zealand 
Parliament to make laws for the Cook Islands altogether,138 patriate the court system,139 
provide for a bill of rights,140 and give recognition to custom.141 Several of these amendments 
were passed explicitly to convince the international community that the Cook Islands was a 
State at international law;142 to remove what the Minister of Justice at the time described as 
perceived “vestiges of the Colonial System”. 143 The result has been a Constitution with a real 
‘separate identity’.144 On this basis, it must be concluded that at least some of the ‘lost’ 
constituent power has been regained as the people have reasserted their constituent power. 
B Niue 
Niue’s constitutional experience is a ‘rags to riches’ tale – starting out poorly, it eventually 
proved to be an enriching experience for the Niuean people.  
                                                
135 Report of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Friday 23 August 1963 (Quote of Hon T Roi).  
136 The Constitution of the Cook Islands, art 8. 
137 Laws of New Zealand, above n 75, at [8].  
138 Cook Islands Constitution (Amendment No 9) Act 1980-81, s 5. 
139 Section 7.  
140 Section 8. 
141 Cook Islands Constitution (Amendment No 17) Act 1994-5, s 7. 
142 Laws of New Zealand, above n 75, at [15]. 
143 Press statement made by Cook Islands Minister of Justice at time of introduction of Constitution Amendment 
(No 9) Bill. As quoted in CC Aikman “Constitutional Developments in the Cook Islands” in Peter Sack (ed) 
Pacific Constitutions (ANU Printing, Canberra, 1982) 87 at 89. 
144 Aikman, “Constitutional Developments in the Cook Islands”, above n 143, at 89.  
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At the outset, New Zealand has been accused of “resort[ing] to an approach which strongly 
implied desperation in dealing with the Niue situation.”145 As was the case in the Cook 
Islands, New Zealand wanted Niue to rapidly shift from a colony to a fully self-governing 
state. Niue however did not desire any such rapid change. By initially overlooking the 
concerns of the Niuean people, New Zealand risked making decisions on Niue’s behalf and 
displacing the people’s constituent power.  
Before New Zealand presented the CILA and the NIA with four options for constitutional 
change, the New Zealand Cabinet had already approved a timetable towards self-
government.146 “Whether the Cook Islands and Niue Assemblies were implicitly aware that 
these four alternatives did not offer any real choice did not seem to concern New Zealand”, 
explains Chapman.147 New Zealand’s unilateral approach to dealing with Niue however 
continued. In 1962, after the NIA had cautiously accepted self-government in principle, New 
Zealand proceeded to present a timetable for Niue’s shift to self-government to the UN, 
before having discussed any such timetable with the NIA.  
Behind New Zealand’s hasty approach was clear pressure from the UN which was committed 
to “bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations”.148  Though purporting to champion the Niuean people’s rights - the UN’s 
doctrinaire approach was not appreciated by the people of Niue. They felt like the UN, an 
organisation of which they knew little of, was forcing Niue apart from New Zealand and 
trying to push them into making a decision that vitally concerned them. One member of the 
public said:  “We have been told some time ago that self-government was first suggested by 
New Zealand in connection with the wish of the United Nations. It is the wish of New 
Zealand or the United Nations, but they do not know much about Niue, what Niue can 
produce, how well off Niue is or how badly off financially.”149  
Despite the pressure placed on Niue to decolonise, the NIA refused to be rushed into self-
government. Owing to its fear of change, Niue resisted the pressure from New Zealand and in 
doing so took its constitutional development into its own hands. After consulting the 
people,150 the NIA rejected the timetable offered by New Zealand (that would have seen it 
attain self-government by 1966), and instead passed a resolution stating that the “people 
should be asked by secret ballot” to determine the pace of constitutional developments.151 
The NIA then went on to inform advisers twice that Niue was not ready for constitutional 
change. Eventually, Niue took responsibility for creating its own timetable – informed by 
                                                
145 Chapman, above n 25, at 17. 
146 Confidential Telegram No 276 from Mr McEwan (20 June 1962). Confirmed in a letter to the Resident 
Commissioner of Niue: McEwen “Future Policy in New Zealand’s Island Territories” 22 June 1962. 
147 Chapman, above n 25, at 12. 
148 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, above n 22. 
149 Minutes from the Niue Island Legislative Assembly 21 January 1965 (with Aikman and McEwen) at 5. 
150 Minutes from the Niue Island Legislative Assembly 13-14 August 1963. The Ministers’ reports to the NIA 
were that the people’s views on self-government were very mixed. 
151 Minutes from the Niue Island Legislative Assembly 9 October 1963. 
30 
 
consultation with the local people – according to which it eventually attained self-
government. Once the constitution was drafted, copies were sent to each household before the 
people were asked to vote on it in a UN observed referendum. As reported in the UN Report 
on the Referendum – “the Mission gained the impression that everything possible had been 
done to associate the people of Niue with the issues involved and with the provisions of the 
draft constitution.”152  
Public participation did not render Niue immune to the influence of New Zealand officials 
and advisers, but the potentially undemocratic effect of that influence was significantly 
attenuated because of it. By seeking the people’s opinion on constitutional change, there was 
an unspoken obligation on the New Zealand officials and advisers alike to listen to and be 
guided by those opinions. Professor Quentin-Baxter visited each village, and spoke to 
countless local individuals. His reports and subsequent constitutional recommendations were 
guided by this extensive consultation.153 As the NIA’s adviser, he was clear that his “first 
responsibility is to ensure that every decision does reflect [the Niuean people’s] will, arrived 
at without any outside constraint, and after they have understood the choices and 
implications.” 154 
New Zealand attempted to push Niue along and pre-empt decisions that ultimately were 
Niue’s to make. Assisted by the adviser however, Niue managed to resist that pressure to a 
considerable extent and avoid an otherwise likely external exercise of constituent power. As 
it turned out, it was Niue that retained primary control over its fundamental political 
decisions. As in the Cook Islands, the people were always clear that it would function as a 
democracy with the Queen in Right of New Zealand as its Head of State. Unlike in the Cook 
Islands however, the decision to become self-governing was one made by the people of Niue 
– on their own terms, when they were ready. As Hon R Rex made clear to the UN Visiting 
Mission - “it is self-government we want, we will decide when that will be – not when 
mother New Zealand says and certainly not when the United Nations says.”155  
It could be said that there is intrinsic value in encouraging a country to decolonise and take 
control of its own affairs. Indeed, under certain conditions such encouragement could be seen 
as enhancing the people’s constituent power by offering them a broader range of 
constitutional options. New Zealand’s approach however, at least at the outset, was informed 
by its own interests to get itself off ‘the colonial hook’ and cannot be said to have had this 
effect. Only one of the four ‘options’ (self-government) offered to the Niuean people for 
                                                
152Report of the United Nations Special Mission to Observe the Act of Self-Determination in Niue A/9623/Add 5 
(Part V) Chap XXII (1974) at 25 [81]. 
153 For example, responding to the persistent concerns expressed to him by the people regarding Niue’s 
economic future – Professor Quentin-Baxter recommended the inclusion of a section in the Constitution Act that 
New Zealand would continue to provide “necessary economic and administrative assistance to Niue” (s 7). 
154 RQ Quentin-Baxter, Telegram (20 June 1974) from Geneva to Wellington. As quoted in Alison Quentin-
Baxter “Making Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser”, above n 70, at 273.  
155 Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Niue, 1972 A/AC 109/L 810/Rev 1, Annex 2 (Statement by 
Leader of Government, 21 June 1972). 
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constitutional change in 1962 appear to have ever been treated as a real option by the New 
Zealand government. And though the New Zealand government accepted that it was Niue 
that had to decide when it would become self-governing, the general feeling was that the 
option was when, not if. Explaining why many Niuean people were concerned about 
constitutional change, Professor Quentin-Baxter noted in his first report that there “lay a fear 
that the fixed timetable for constitutional development had never really been withdrawn. It 
had, they felt, continued to tick away while the people were wrapped in a sense of false 
security – until now they found themselves unwillingly on the very brink of self-
determination.” 156 Allowing the status quo to continue while expecting that the desired 
constitutional change will inevitably occur does not amount to enhancing the Niuean people’s 
constitutional options – it rather limits them.  While New Zealand’s influence in the 
constitution-making process in Niue therefore may not have amounted to an exercise of 
constituent power, it did not have the positive effect of enhancing a popular exercise. 
It is interesting to note that Niue’s Constitution has only ever been amended once.157 The 
Constitution’s stringent amendment procedure has undoubtedly contributed to its lack of 
amendments. Every proposed amendment, along with attaining the requisite parliamentary 
majority,158 must be submitted to a popular referendum. For most amendments a simple 
majority will suffice. For certain provisions however, including those relating to Niue’s 
political relationship with New Zealand,159 two thirds support for the amendment is required. 
The Constitution has unsurprisingly been described as a “rigid” constitution.160 This has been 
credited with its stability, but it raises concerns that the people’s constituent power is being 
constrained. It was at the insistence of the local people however that these provisions were 
included. The people did not want the Constitution, and in particular those provisions relating 
to Niue’s on-going relationship with New Zealand, to be subject to the whim of politicians.161 
As such, the very provisions in the Niue Constitution which restrict amendments by the 
popular constituent power are themselves a former expression of that same power. These 
considerations go towards a conclusion that, though constituent power may not have been 
reclaimed, it does not appear that it was ever lost in the first place.  
                                                
156 RQ Quentin-Baxter “Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue”, above 
n 65, at 6[8]. 
157 Constitution Amendment (No 1) Act 1992. This was an omnibus bill comprising three amendments for 
which voters could vote in favour of all or none. Amendments included those to patriate the court system and 
make the specialist Lands Courts a division of the High Court (s 4), change the qualifications for electors and 
candidates (s 2), and repeal the special provisions for proposed legislation relating to criminal law or status of 
persons (s 3). 
158 The proposed amendment must have the support of two thirds of the NIA members evidenced in two votes 
taken at least 13 weeks apart. Niue Constitution Act 1974, art 35. 
159 Sections 2-9, and arts 1 and 69. 
160 AH Angelo “The Niue Constitution” (2009) 15 Revue Juridique Polynésienne 157 at 179. 
161 RQ Quentin-Baxter “Second Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of 
Niue”, above n 69, at 583. 
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VI A Better Approach: A Two-Stage Model 
Constitution-making ought to be a national exercise – one in which the people come together 
and map out their future political order. For a range of reasons however,162 an external state 
will often play a key role in the future political order of small, dependent non-self-governing 
island-states. Any model for constitution-making for such island-states would best recognise 
this fact and be modelled accordingly.  
This section will propose a model of constitution-making that expressly recognises a role for 
an external state (or several). It is designed with the remaining non-self-governing island-
states in mind: American Samoa, Guam, Pitcairn, French Polynesia, New Caledonia and 
Tokelau in the Pacific, and Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, US Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Turks and Caicos Islands and St 
Helena in the Caribbean and Atlantic.163 The model would apply in the instance that these 
island-states sought to shift towards a formal self-governing status of some description (as 
opposed to full integration with an external state, or full independence) as was the case in the 
Cook Islands and Niue.164 The model proceeds on the view, as defended in the previous 
sections of this paper, that it is possible to have an exercise of popular constituent power 
while involving an external state in the constitution-making process. The key object of the 
proposed model is to provide an avenue for the external state to participate in or contribute to 
the process while ensuring that this does not impinge on the people’s exercise of constituent 
power. It is ultimately aimed at enhancing the democratic legitimacy of external influence in 
constitution-making.    
Before the proposed model is outlined, the constitutional experience of Tokelau, New 
Zealand’s last remaining dependent territory,165 will be discussed in brief. In 2006 and 2007, 
the people of Tokelau were asked to vote in referenda to determine whether Tokelau would 
become self-governing in free association with New Zealand. Though the requisite proportion 
of votes to decolonise was not met, the pre-referendum processes offer insight into a unique 
approach to constitution-making for small dependent island-states seeking to decolonise.  
                                                
162 There are several reasons why a non-self-governing territory would choose some form of associated 
statehood over full independence. An associated political status normally entails significant administrative and 
economic benefits, social welfare assistance, higher quality health and education assistance, natural disaster 
relief, and the provision of costly external defence. Further, there are significant employment and material 
benefits that comes with retaining shared citizenship. Overall, the empirical data has shown that island-states 
that are not fully independent enjoy a higher living standard than independent states. See generally G Bertram 
“On the Convergence of Small Island Economies with their metropolitan powers” (2004) 32 World 
Development 343 at 353; and Godfrey Baldacchino, above n 4, at 193. 
163 Elements of the model may be relevant to self-governing states (like the Cook Islands and Niue) that wish to 
undergo further constitutional change while retaining ties with an external state. 
164 While the non-self-governing island-states share characteristics, the particular features of each island-state 
would need to be carefully considered. 
165 The Tokelau Act 1948 established Tokelau as “part of New Zealand”. Having rejected self-government, 
Tokelau remains a dependent territory of New Zealand. It is still on the UN list of non-self-governing territories. 
See Andrew Townend “Tokelau’s 2006 Referendum on Self-Government’ (2007) 5 NZJPIL 127; and AH 
Angelo “The Constitution of Tokelau (2009) 15 Revue Juridique Polynésienne 181. 
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The referenda to decide on the future status of Tokelau proceeded on the basis of two 
documents: the draft Treaty of Free Association and the draft Constitution. These documents 
were to provide the legal framework for Tokelau if it were to become self-governing. The 
documents were related but designed to serve two distinct purposes: the draft Treaty outlined 
the terms of the relationship of free association between the two states, while the draft 
Constitution set the rules for Tokelau’s self-government. In light of the distinct functions, the 
documents were the products of distinct processes: the Treaty was a “collaborative effort 
between Tokelau and New Zealand,” while the draft Constitution was a “Tokelauan effort 
throughout”.166  
The initiative to record Tokelau’s prospective relationship with New Zealand in a treaty was 
proposed by the constitutional adviser, Professor Tony Angelo.  There was a general fear in 
Tokelau that support would decrease if self-government was attained, as had been observed 
in the Cook Islands and Niue. It was considered that, by binding the parties at the 
international level, stronger protection would be afforded to the relationship while also 
placing the parties on an equal footing in the instance that obligations were breached or 
sought to be modified.167 
For Tokelau, the result of the pre-referendum effort was a fully autochthonous draft 
Constitution.168 Its substance was an articulation of a political order that had emerged, for the 
most part, internally – and reflected a ‘coral-up’ approach.  To come into force, the 
Constitution was “to spring forth”, not by a positive act by the New Zealand Parliament, but 
by its withdrawal.169 At the same time, by virtue of the draft Treaty, Tokelau was to maintain 
its New Zealand citizenship and was assured on-going economic and administrative support 
“to maintain and improve the quality of life of the people of Tokelau”.170  
 
Looking back at the constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue, it is clear that 
there were problems stemming from tying the decision regarding the states’ political status 
(and hence the future relationship with New Zealand) with the constitution-making 
process.171 The uncertainty regarding New Zealand’s intentions throughout consistently 
                                                
166 Townend, above n 165, at 144. 
167 Compare this position with that of the Cook Islands and Niue. New Zealand can alter the terms of the 
relationship by amending the relevant Acts by a simple majority in the New Zealand Parliament. The Cook 
Islands and Niue can only change the terms of the relationship according to the amendment provisions in the 
respective Constitutions – which for Niue especially, presents a significant hurdle. 
168 Had the referenda been successful, the draft Constitution would have become the supreme law of Tokelau. 
As this did not happen, it remains in place as a consolidation of key constitutional rules already in force. See 
Angelo “The Constitution of Tokelau”, above n 165, at 182. 
169 Andrew Townend, above n 165, at 149. 
170 Draft Treaty of Free Association between New Zealand and Tokelau, New Zealand-Tokelau, art 4. 
171 Interestingly, there is an implicit distinction between the two stages in the Constitutions. As explained by 
Professor Angelo, “[t]he physical and terminological distinction in the Constitution of Niue between its sections 
and its articles … reflects two sides of the coin: the relationship of free association with New Zealand and the 
self-governing state.” Angelo “The Niue Constitution”, above n 160, at 159. 
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overshadowed the constitutional deliberations – diverting attention away from matters of 
constitutional design.172 Further, by not clearly delineating at what stage New Zealand’s 
involvement was appropriate, its influence permeated the entirety of the constitution-making 
process. In both cases, New Zealand’s role failed to enhance the constituent power of the 
people, and in the case of the Cook Islands, it ultimately led to an external exercise of 
constituent power. 
The approach taken in Tokelau largely avoided the issues faced in the Cook Islands and Niue 
by procedurally separating out the processes pertaining to the states’ future political status 
and the constitution. Building on Tokelau’s experience, the proposed model therefore 
consists of two stages. To reduce the risk of undemocratic external influence in the 
constitution-making process to the greatest extent possible, it will further propose temporally 
separating the processes regarding a non-self-governing state’s political status and 
constitutional regime – with a recognised interim period in between.173  
The first stage of the proposed model would centre on determining the future political status 
of the non-self-governing state. As any proposed change in the state’s political status would 
likely involve on-going relations with an external state (eg in the form of a relationship of 
free association), the external state would enjoy a recognised role during this stage. 
Representatives of both states would convene to negotiate the terms of the states’ future 
relationship and the on-going obligations on each. Though this stage may take the form of 
negotiations between political powers, there is nothing preventing a high level of public 
consultation throughout. Some aspects of the negotiations may indeed have to be closed,174 
but to ensure that the respective parties are fully aware of the relevant considerations and 
interests at stake, the public should be informed of the issues and given a forum through 
which to communicate their views.  
                                                
172 This was picked up by Sir Leslie Munro during the Select Committee. He noted: “When I was there about 
three months ago I do not think anybody approached me and spoke to me about this constitution. All I had were 
questions as to whether the people would have the right to come to NZ whenever they liked. Do you agree that 
this is a pretty common approach?” Mr Dare (Resident Commissioner): “Yes, I think so.” See Report of 
Evidence Given before Island Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution 
Bill, Wednesday 23 September 1964 at 82. 
173 This model draws on Arato’s two-stage ‘democratic constitution-making’ model, but departs from his model 
in several key ways. Arato perceives two instances that play a fundamental role in the drafting process: an 
“instance that drafts the interim constitution, typically a round table of major political forces, and an instance 
that drafts the final document, always a freely elected body…” The former instance creates constitution-making 
rules that are binding on the latter. For post-conflict states, this process provides promise – but it is rejected for 
application in the context of small dependent states. Procedurally, it is over complicated for such small 
jurisdictions, and substantively, it clashes with the position defended in this paper that constituent power should 
not be limited or constrained. The general thrust of Arato’s recognition of “the importance of state building in 
the first stage and regime creation dominating in the second stage” is picked up in the proposed model. See 
Andrew Arato “Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign Constitution Making” (2009) 22 Int J Polit 
Cult Soc 427.  
174 As is the case with constitution-making. See Elster, above n 12, at 388. 
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Once the parties have agreed on the nature and form of the states’ future relationship, the 
outcome of the negotiations would be encapsulated in a treaty.175 As proposed by Alison 
Quentin-Baxter in her ‘sustained autonomy’ model, the international community would 
thereby become “the guarantor of the continuation of the necessary support for small 
autonomous islands”. It would be on the basis of this treaty that the people would vote in a 
referendum to determine their future political status.  If rejected, no change would occur – the 
status quo would continue.176 If the proposed change is accepted however, the treaty would 
subsequently be signed by the respective parties and enter into force. Regardless of what they 
choose, the people in the island-state would retain the power to change their political status at 
any point in the future.177 
A successful referendum, in which the requisite proportion of people voted in favour of the 
proposed new political status, would constitute an internationally recognised act of self-
determination. The former territory’s status, under which its international personality was 
severely limited,178 would come to an end. This is made clear in Resolution 2625 of the 
General Assembly, which states:179  
The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has under the Charter, a 
status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate 
and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-
Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the 
Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles. 
By exercising its right to self-determination in a fair and free referendum, the newly self-
governing state would attain the capacity to enter into treaties – such as that between it and 
the external state. Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares that 
                                                
175 Alison Quentin-Baxter “Sustained Autonomy: An Alternative Political Status for Small Islands” (1994) 24 
VUWLR 1 at 17. In her model, the external state would enter into a treaty with an international organisation, 
though it seems more appropriate that the primary state itself be a party to the treaty as was to be the case in 
Tokelau. 
176 For an argument in favour of the UN General Assembly recognising the status quo see Elisabeth Perham “A 
Solution for the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism: A ‘Fourth’ Option to Obviate the 
Need for a Fourth Decade?” (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2013) at 32. 
177 This is required under the General Assembly Resolution 1541, Principle VII(a). See Principles which should 
guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under 
Article 73e of the Charter  GA Res 1541, XV (1960). 
178 For example, although Tokelau is substantially self-governing in practice, as a dependent territory of New 
Zealand, it does not have a separate international legal personality. For the most part, the New Zealand 
Government undertakes any treaty making in respect of on the basis of consultation with the Government of 
Tokelau. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs “International Treaty Making: Guidance for government agencies on 
practice and procedures for concluding international treaties and arrangements” (September 2012) 
<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/treaties-and-international-law/International-Treaty-Making-Guide-
2012.pdf>. For comments of the Special Rapporteur on the treaty-making capacity of protectorates and other 
dependent States, see generally Sir Humphrey Waldock "First Report on the Law of Treaties" Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission [1962] vol 2 YILC at 37. 
179 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations GA Res 2625, XXV A/RES/2625 (1970) (emphasis 
added). 
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"every State" has the capacity to conclude treaties.180 The international statehood of 
associated States has not always been recognised. When the Cook Islands and Niue became 
self-governing, it was not considered possible for them to enter into international treaties. As 
evidenced by the range of multilateral and bilateral treaties that the Cook Islands and Niue 
have entered into since decolonisation,181 it is clear that it is now possible for associated 
States to be recognised as ‘States’ for the purpose of international law.182 Furthermore, “there 
is a clear tendency”, explains Igarashi, “to recognize the international personality of 
Associated States as much as possible, once the right of self-determination has been 
established.”183 
If the island-state chooses to become self-governing, it would proceed to the second stage of 
the model to define a new constitutional regime.  Unlike the first stage, this process would be 
the sole domain of the newly self-governing state (or more precisely, its constituent or 
legislative assembly). There would be no direct role for the external state - though external 
advice or funding voluntarily sought may be appropriate. Following a participative and open 
constitution-making process, the people would be invited to vote on the proposed constitution 
in a second referendum. If affirmed, the proposed Constitution would become supreme law 
by an action of the newly self-governing states’ legislative assembly.   
The question remaining regarding this proposed model is: if a state accepts a change in 
political status, in what form and under what authority does the political regime operate in the 
interim before a new constitution passes into force? In order to keep the process as simple as 
possible, it is desirable that the states’ former governance structures continue to operate as 
per normal. For most former territories this would pose no problem as they function at the 
                                                
180 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS, 331 (23 May 1969). The Convention does not define 
the term ‘State’, but commentary of the International Law Commission on the draft article that became article 6 
explains that “[t]he term "State" … means a State for the purposes of international law.” Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission [1966] vol 2 YILC at 192. See generally Daniel Turp and Francois Roch 
“Article 6: Capacity of States to Conclude Treaties” in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds) The Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 107. 
181 This path was forged by the Cook Islands. After the World Health Organisation accepted the Cook Islands’ 
membership application in 1984, and its subsequent admittance to the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the 
United Nations (1985), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (1985) and 
International Civil Aviation Organization (1986), the Secretary-General recognised it as a full member without 
any specifications or limitations in 1992 with full treaty-making capacity. The full treaty-making capacity of 
Niue was recognised by the Secretary-General in 1994.  See Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as 
Depositary of Multilateral treaties UN Doc ST/LEG/7/Rev 1 (1994) at [82]-[87]. The treaty-making capacity of 
the Cook Islands was made further clear in the Joint Declaration between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, 
which stipulates that “[t]he Government of the Cook Islands possesses the capacity to enter into treaties and 
other international agreements in its own right with governments and regional and international organisations.” 
Joint Centenary Declaration of the Principles of the Relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands 
(Rarotonga, 11 June 2001) at cl 5. See generally Laws of New Zealand, above n 75, at [34]. 
182 The focus is on the competence of the particular associated State. Alison Quentin-Baxter explains: “the test is 
whether the associated State is competent to exercise, and does in fact exercise, responsibility for the conduct of 
its external relations in its own right and not as an organ of its partner State”. See Laws of New Zealand, above n 
75, at [34]. 
183 Masahiro Igarashi Associated Statehood in International Law (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 
2002) at 300. 
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day-to-day level as self-governing states already. Where this is not the case, a basic interim 
constitution may need to be considered.184  
In relation to constitution-making in small dependent states - several benefits flow from fully 
separating the decision regarding the political relationship with the external state from the 
constitutional deliberations. For an external (former colonising) state, this model offers a 
means to engage in the decolonisation process so to discharge its “obligation to promote to 
the utmost … the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories”,185 while ensuring that 
such involvement does not detract from the democratic legitimacy of the process overall. It 
also ensures that Principle VII(b) of GA Res 1541 which  states that an “associated territory 
should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference, in 
accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people” - 
is afforded respect.186 
For the island-state, by clearly delineating the stage at which the external state has a role, its 
influence can be contained and channelled so as to avoid a potential external exercise of 
constituent power. Further, by determining the political status and future relationship with the 
external state prior to constitutional deliberations, the people can focus their attention on their 
future constitutional regime and properly assess their options. Finally, the risk that the people 
may feel pressure to acquiesce to the external state’s suggestions, or are in some way 
beholden to it, is significantly reduced. The two latter benefits in particular flow from a 
temporal separating out of the two stages.   
For both states, providing a democratically legitimate avenue for the external state to be 
involved in the constitution-making process of the island-state ultimately fosters an 
enhancement of the latter’s constituent power. For the most part, it is the non-self-governing 
state that wishes to maintain on-going ties with an external state. To wholly exclude a role an 
external state in the constitution-making process would limit the options available for non-
self-governing island-states. So that such island-states can fully explore what model of 
continued association suits their particular needs and aspirations – it is important to provide a 
democratically legitimate means for an external state to be involved in the constitution-
making process.   
                                                
184 Interim Constitutions have been widely used, particularly in post-conflict situations, for example in South 
Africa (1993), Nepal (2007), and Iraq (2004). See generally Michele Brandt, Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai and 
Anthony Regan Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process (Interpeace, Switzerland, 2011) at 
2.1.9. 
185 Charter of the United Nations, art 73.  
186 Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Article 73e of the Charter  GA Res 1541, XV (1960). 
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VII Conclusion  
Reflecting on the persistence of colonialism in the Pacific, Alison Quentin-Baxter makes the 
following comment:187  
In very small islands that are still non-self-governing, the concern is not the continuation of 
colonial status. It is the possible ending of that status and with it the ending or substantial 
reduction of the administering power's present support. The real enemy is not present 
exploitation. It is future neglect. 
Classical constituent power theory demands that a constitution be the product of a popular 
exercise of constituent power; an act of self-determination undertaken by the people, for the 
people. This paper has argued that the existence of external influence in the constitution-
making process is not necessarily at odds with this. The democratic legitimacy of the 
constitution-making process is dependent on the constitution being a manifestation of the 
people’s constituent power. Insofar as external actors do not displace the people’s constituent 
power but rather enhance it however, there is no reason to exclude such influence; there may 
even be reason to encourage it.  
This paper has rejected generalised verdicts regarding external influence and advocated in 
favour of a particularised assessment that takes as its focus the effect of external influence on 
the exercise of constituent power. A constitution ought to be authored by the people, for the 
people. External influence that assists the people in this regard is welcome. External 
influence that amounts to authoring the constitution on the people’s behalf however amounts 
to an external exercise of constituent power, which in turn harms the process’ democratic 
legitimacy.  
The Cook Islands and Niue, like many former non-self-governing territories, did not desire 
full independence at decolonisation. By seeking a relationship of free association with New 
Zealand that included shared citizenship and financial assistance, a role for New Zealand was 
expected and largely welcome throughout the respective island-states’ constitution-making 
processes. As has been shown however, in neither instance did New Zealand enhance the 
people’s constituent power, and in the case of the Cook Islands, New Zealand exercised a 
degree of constituent power. 
New Zealand’s more recent decolonising experience with Tokelau points towards a more 
promising approach to constitution-making in non-self-governing island-states. Tokelau 
ultimately chose not to become an associated state. By drawing on its experience however, 
this paper has advanced a two-stage model for constitution-making designed with the 
remaining 15 non-self-governing island-states in mind. As on-going political ties with an 
                                                
187 Alison Quentin-Baxter “Sustained Autonomy: An Alternative Political Status for Small Islands”, above n 
175, at 3. 
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external state are often sought at decolonisation by such island-states, the aim of the model is 
to provide an avenue for that external state to participate in or contribute to the constitution-
making process while maintaining the process’ democratic legitimacy. 
The persistence of colonialism into the 21st century has not overall been a tale of oppression, 
but rather a purposeful act of self-determination. Non-self-governing communities continue 
to respond to their political and social realities as best they can, with an aim of ensuring the 
brightest possible future for their future generations. For some, this has meant retaining 
colonial ties with an external actor. This paper has not attempted to propose a model 
relationship of political association for such small dependent island-states – but it has 
presented a model for constitution-making in the instance that they wish to go down that path.  
“Listen and observe, assist when asked, find and smooth the way forward 
to a viable self-governing future for the territory – that is the role for 
those outside. The advisors will not live in the decolonised territory, the 
United Nations Committee of 24 will not live there, the colonial 
governors or administrators will not live there – but, if Tokelau is the 
example, Tokelauans will.”188  
  
                                                
188 AH Angelo, Constitutional Adviser to Tokelau “Statement by the Constitutional Adviser to the United 
Nations Committee of 24” (Pacific Regional Seminar, Nadi, 14-16 May 2002) in AH Angelo and A Townend 
Tokelau: A Collection of Documents and References Relating to Constitutional Development (ed 4, Law 
Publications, Wellington, 2003) at 193. 
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